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Abstract: China is increasingly perceived in Central and Eastern Europe as a country which 
could bring economic success to the countries of the region through developing trade 
relations and growing inflow of Chinese investment. Within the region, Hungary is regarded 
as occupying a prominent position by Chinese people and the government for several 
reasons. Chinese relations have historically been good: over the past decade Hungarian 
governments have committed themselves to developing the relationship. This trend was 
further confirmed after the global economic crisis of 2008, when Hungary started looking for 
new opportunities in its recovery from recession. The “Eastern opening” policy was initiated 
after the crisis and partly because of it. Officially, this policy puts more emphasis on further 
developing Chinese–Hungarian relations than was previously the case, including increasing 
trade and investment. However, the outcomes of the policy – such as the construction of the 
Budapest–Belgrade railway line – can be evaluated in different ways. 
 
In recent years, Chinese companies have increasingly been targeting Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries, with the Visegrad countries and Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia 
being among the most popular. Although when compared to China’s economic presence 
globally or in the developed world, its economic impact on CEE countries is small but has 
increased significantly in the past decade: trade volumes are continually growing and the 
region has also seen inflows of Chinese investment. This is quite a new phenomenon but not 
an unexpected one: on one hand, the transformation of the global economy and restructuring 
of China’s economy are responsible for growing Chinese interest in CEE and, on the other 
hand, CEE represents new challenges and new opportunities for China. An additional impetus 
was found in the European sovereign debt crisis which made CEE governments more open to 
Chinese business opportunities. 
Within the CEE region, Hungary’s relations with China have been unique in several ways. 
They are unique in a historic sense, since Hungary was one of the first countries to formally 
recognize China, and the Hungarian government started to re-establish relations with China 
well before the other CEE countries, back in the early 2000s. Furthermore they are unique in a 
political sense, since Hungary is the only country in Central and Eastern Europe to have 
adopted an official government strategy towards Asia (and China): its “Eastern opening” 
policy. Lastly, they are unique in the sense that Hungary is the destination of the majority of 
Chinese foreign direct investment in the region, whilst serving as a regional hub for several 
Chinese companies and having the biggest Chinese population in CEE. Nonetheless – given 
the nature of Hungarian domestic politics – of much greater interest is the fact that relations 
are also unique in terms of the long-term political support Hungarian governments, regardless 
of political orientation, have provided over the past fifteen years as part of their commitment 
to developing relations with China.  
As Prime Minister Orbán put it when unveiling his government’s “Eastern opening” policy, 
“We are sailing under a Western flag, though an Eastern wind is blowing in the world 
economy.”1 Indeed, Hungary has achieved good results in its economic relations with China 
over the past decade. Nonetheless, some successful deals have led to further – sometimes 
excessive – expectations over Chinese involvement, particularly concerning infrastructure 
development and the financing of Hungarian public debt. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to 
analyze the nature of China’s economic presence in CEE countries focusing on Chinese–
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Hungarian relations, highlighting the main motivations and Hungary’s expectations and 
outcomes achieved. 
 
Motivations on both sides 
 
In 2000, the Chinese government initiated its “go global” (zou chu qu) policy aimed at 
encouraging domestic companies to become globally competitive. It introduced new policies 
to encourage firms to engage in overseas activities in specific industries, particularly in 
relation to trade. In 2001 this was integrated and formalized under the 10
th
 five-year plan, 
which also echoed the importance of the “go global” policy.2 This policy shift was part of the 
continuing reform and liberalization of the Chinese economy and also reflected the Chinese 
government’s desire to create internationally competitive and well-known companies and 
brands.  
As China’s economic growth has begun to slow, the economy is facing new challenges and its 
economic strategy is transforming. Furthermore the country’s global trade and investment 
position and strategies are altering as well. New challenges require new answers, particularly 
regarding the fact that China has chosen not to stimulate its economy by turning only inwards 
but by opting for diplomacy, trade and investment to broaden China’s sphere of interest and 
business opportunities. In this way, it can promote economic relations, people-to-people links 
and political influence whilst strengthening the legitimacy of the ruling party and Xi Jinping. 
Thus the focus on new directions, referred to as Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” (yi dai yi lu) 
initiative, is the result of domestic politics, geopolitics and historical and economic reasons. 
Relations between China and the CEE region date back to ancient times, when these regions 
were closely linked together over 2,000 years ago via the (old) Silk Road. Now, after a long 
break, the relationship is about to be revived through the (new) Silk Road. Naturally, there 
were also connections between China and CEE during the Cold War and in the 1990s. Some 
countries had better ties, while others were less friendly, but generally, the region had no 
special role from either the Chinese or CEE point of view. Attitudes gradually began to 
change after the millennium. 
When the CEE countries became members of the European Union, China developed an 
interest in its strengthening ties. The CEE’s growth potential, institutional stability and market 
size attracted Chinese companies. In fact, Beijing sees Central and Eastern Europe not only as 
one of its new frontiers for export expansion but also as a strategic entry point for the wider 
European market. It chose this region because CEE countries have dynamic, largely 
developed, less saturated economies directly connected to the EU common market. Chinese 
corporations can significantly cut business costs by setting up in CEE countries and can 
integrate into the EU industrial network, while there are fewer political expectations 
and economic complaints (or rather these are expressed more quietly) than in Western 
Europe. 
Initially, Chinese companies used to treat the region as a “back door” to European markets but 
recently their motivations have expanded more towards efficiency-oriented and strategic asset 
seeking motives. Chinese outward investment flows and stock as well as trade volumes have 
steadily increased over the last decade and a half, particularly after 2008, due to the changes 
in global economic conditions, that is, the global economic and financial crisis. The crisis 
created new challenges for China and brought more overseas opportunities for Chinese 
companies to grow their share of the world economy as the number of ailing or financially 
distressed firms has increased.  
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Xi Jinping’s  2009 vice-presidential tour to Europe signaled a real shift in the Chinese 
leadership’s attitude toward the Central and Eastern European region, and marked the 
beginning of a new stage in bilateral relations. Xi made an extended tour of Europe, visiting 
Belgium, Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary (and spent longer in Budapest). The 
tour was framed as a visit to consolidate and develop economic cooperation between China 
and these five countries but Xi’s visit to Central and Eastern Europe was more about China’s 
evolving “go-out” investment strategy, indicating that the Chinese were eager to accelerate 
their diversification strategy through the emerging countries in the region. 
If we examine the motivations of the CEE, we see that their “eastern awakening” dates back 
to the same time. As China became a major player in the world economy and politics, CEE 
became more interested in developing relations with China. The economic and financial crisis 
was an additional impetus as CEE governments started to seek out new opportunities in their 
recovery from the recession. Before the crisis, many CEE countries had had mixed feelings 
about closer economic ties with China. On the one hand, they actively wanted to attract 
Chinese investment, and were anxious about losing out on trade and business opportunities 
with China. On the other hand, there were fears about the reliability of Chinese firms or 
because of human rights. Today an increasing number of CEE countries have decided to cast 
aside their doubts and even the coolest relations (like Czech–Chinese relations) have entered a 
warmer period. However, it is true that despite all this, most CEE governments lack a unified 
strategy towards China or Chinese companies – Hungary is one of the few exceptions. In the 
spring of 2012 the government launched a new economic policy with special emphasis on its 
“Eastern opening” policy, formulated after and partly as a result of the crisis.3 
 
Chinese–Hungarian relations: in retrospect 
 
Hungary formally recognized the People’s Republic of China on October 4, 1949. During the 
following decade their relationship began to develop with a large number of high-level visits 
followed by an improvement in economic, political and cultural ties. Although the 
Hungarian–Chinese relationship was basically within the Soviet sphere of interest, Hungarian 
foreign policy did not follow Moscow policy but diverged slightly. In international affairs 
Budapest cooperated closely with Beijing and supported the Chinese position on Tibet, the 
reunification of China (“one China” policy) and United Nations (Security Council) 
membership.  
By the end of the 1950s, deep ideological differences began to appear between the two 
countries and, after the 1960s – during the Chinese “cultural revolution” – the relationship 
became considerably colder. Later, with the refocusing of the Chinese Communist Party in 
1978 (economic reforms and opening-up policy) the two countries were brought closer 
together again. The Chinese leadership was genuinely interested in Hungary’s experiences of 
its 1968 and 1984 economic reforms and so a series of expert delegations visited Hungary. In 
the 1980s, state and inter-party relations were normalized and high-level delegations were 
also reinitiated. However, this upturn did not last long, as after the democratic transition of 
1989, contact between the two countries declined again, primarily as a result of the refocusing 
of Hungarian foreign policy, which paid greater attention to Euro-Atlantic interests. For more 
than a decade, contact declined to a minimum.  
A new fruitful period began at the beginning of the new millennium with the 2003 visit of 
then Hungarian prime minister, Peter Medgyessy, to Beijing. This new wave of development 
was initiated independently by Hungary since the government recognized China’s growing 
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role in the global economy and it was well received in China because forthcoming EU 
membership made Hungary more attractive to them. In this spirit, various gestures and 
diplomatic visits
4
 were made and confidence-building measures were adopted. The results 
were almost immediately apparent: Chinese investments started to flow into the country and 
trade also took off (see Figure 1 and 2). 
The Medgyessy government created a special envoy post within the Prime Minister’s Office 
to develop Hungarian–Chinese relations and coordinate the China-related work of the 
government’s institutions and public administration. Since then, Hungarian governments have 
usually had a commissioner or special representative to handle Hungarian–Chinese relations.  
The first outcomes of Hungary’s new China policy were the arrival of a branch of the Bank of 
China in Hungary (2003), the creation of the Bilingual Chinese–Hungarian Primary School in 
Budapest (2004) and the launch of direct flights between Budapest and Beijing (2004). All of 
these were unique in the region at that time. There were many other consequences of this 
period – a complete list would be too long here5 – including the establishment of a Chinese 
wholesale trade center in Budapest for quality Asian exporters and manufacturers, which 
indicate the strong renewal of the relationship. 
Although China was neglected by the first Orbán government (1998–2002), it has been 
favored by the second (2010–2014) and third (2014–). Viktor Orbán continually emphasized 
the importance of the East, even during his election campaign, saying that “[…]an Eastern 
wind is blowing in the world economy”6 to which the Hungarian economy needs to adapt. As 
a result, the Chinese–Hungarian economic relationship has been intensifying of late.  
During Prime Minister Orbán’s visit to China at the end of 2010, he negotiated the Chinese 
buyout of Hungarian biochemical giant, BorsodChem, which was purchased for 1.23 billion 
euros by China’s Wanhua Industrial Group in February 2011. Then, in May 2011, Chinese 
State Councilor Dai Bingguo visited Budapest to discuss joint business deals in 
transportation, aviation and energy, as well as political and cultural cooperation. Then premier 
Wen Jiabao made a follow-up visit to Budapest in the summer of 2011. Before the visit, 
Hungary had already reached an agreement involving the Hungarian Railway Company 
(MÁV) and China Railway Construction Corporation, while Chinese telecommunications 
manufacturing giant, Huawei – which already operates logistics centers in Hungary – 
announced that it would be expanding its distribution center in the country, making it 
Huawei's second-largest supply center in the world. Further issues, such as financial 
cooperation and raising project capital, were also discussed at this time.  
In 2011 Wen Jiabao’s European tour involved only three countries: Hungary, the United 
Kingdom and Germany, and it began in Budapest. Wen’s tour was organized so China could 
buy European debt and “help” Europe by shoring up its investments. Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán signed a dozen agreements worth around 2.62 billion euros, the most beneficial set of 
Chinese–Hungarian economic deals to date, including plans for joint investment in a 
Hungarian solar panel plant; a citric acid factory; development of air, water and rail 
transportation; and plans to develop Hungary’s Szombathely airport into a major European 
cargo base.
7
 Finally, Premier Wen promised to purchase an unspecified amount of Hungarian 
debt.  
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After Wen’s visit, expectations on the Hungarian side were higher than ever. The domestic 
media echoed the importance of the country’s role as a gateway to China while the 
international media reported on the new Chinese–Hungarian “special relationship,” causing 
mixed feelings among Hungary’s neighbors and the EU institutions. Against this background, 
Hungary launched a new foreign economic policy in the spring of 2012, which aimed to 
diversify Hungary’s foreign economic relations.  
 
“Eastern opening” strategy and Hungary’s China-policy: (un)realistic expectations? 
 
First, it has to be emphasized that Chinese–Hungarian relations have produced clear economic 
results. China is one of Hungary’s most important trading partners in terms of imports: since 
2005, it has ranked fourth (except for in 2010, when it held third place). By 2012, the Chinese 
share of Hungary’s total imports increased by more than two-and-a-half times, and the value 
of imports rose more than five-fold on 2003. Between 2003 and 2008, Chinese imports 
increased by an average annual rate of 24 per cent. Since 2010, the value of imports has been 
between 3.9 and 4.3 billion euros annually. The value of Hungary’s exports to China is 
significantly lower than its imports. Nonetheless, it has been increasing since the turn of the 
millennium (see Figure 1). China is Hungary’s 15th most important import partner – and 
foremost among Asian countries, with Hungarian exports to China representing around 2 per 
cent of Hungary’s total exports.  
 
Figure 1. Trade between China and Hungary, 2005–2014 
 
Source: CEIC China Premium Database, based on Chinese statistics 
 
Chinese investment to Hungary started to increase significantly after Hungary joined the EU 
in 2004. According to Chinese statistics, it rapidly increased from 0.65 million US dollars in 
2005 to 370.1 million US dollars in 2010. In 2010, Hungary received 89 per cent of the total 
Chinese capital flow to the CEE region.
8
 By 2014, the amount of Chinese investment had 
further increased reaching 556 million US dollars according to Chinese statistics, which is by 
far the highest in the region (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, the amount is far greater when 
taking cumulative Hungarian data into account, since a significant portion of Chinese 
investment is received via intermediary countries or companies and so appears elsewhere in 
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the Chinese statistics. According to Hungarian reports (cumulative data), Chinese investment 
in Hungary was about 3 billion US dollars by 2014. However, the majority of Chinese 
investment is connected to a handful of big deals rather than several smaller ones. 
 
Figure 2. China’s OFDI stock in CEEC, 2003–2014, selected countries 
 
Source: CEIC China Premium Database, based on Chinese statistics 
 
As a result of the global crisis and the recent achievements mentioned above, a new and more 
intensive phase has begun in Hungarian–Chinese relations. In order to help Hungarian 
companies benefit from the rapid growth of emerging markets, several organizations have 
been established and a new foreign economic policy launched in Hungary with special 
emphasis on the “Eastern opening” strategy. Although the Orbán government has emphasized 
that it would like to maintain Hungary’s strong and important economic relations with its 
traditional Western partners, the main objective of this policy has been to reduce Hungary’s 
economic dependence on trade with the West by improving economic relations with the East, 
particularly China. More specifically, the strategy aims to increase Hungary’s exports to 
countries outside Europe to one third of total exports from just under one quarter of total 
exports in 2012. 
In order to achieve these goals, the strategy relies on active state intervention to diversify 
Hungarian exports and its markets, while also developing the export capability of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The foreign economic strategy emphasizes developing 
trade and technology relations with China and other countries such as India, Russia, South 
Korea, Turkey, ASEAN member states, Arab countries and the CIS. An additional goal is to 
grow indirect exports to Asian emerging markets, meaning that Hungarian companies are to 
become suppliers of large European (e.g. German, Austrian and Scandinavian) exporters with 
strong positions in emerging markets.
9
 
To enhance SME entry into the Asian markets, state-owned trading houses were opened to 
help Hungarian SMEs sell their products abroad. By creating trading houses, the government 
seeks to enable Hungarian companies with solid capital to enter new emerging markets. In 
export development, trading houses will function as mediators between Hungarian SMEs and 
foreign buyers. Therefore, at the beginning of 2013, the state-owned National Trading House 
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was established and nearly 30 trading houses have been opened in countries like China, Saudi 
Arabia, Russia and Kazakhstan. In addition, potential cooperation with private trading houses 
has also been considered.
10
 
The foreign economic strategy also recommends developing economic diplomacy, that is, 
strengthening and broadening the network of economic attachés abroad and encouraging more 
aligned cooperation between export financing state banks, the Ministry of National Economy 
and the Trade and Investment Agency. Beside these institutions, greater importance is to be 
attached to the different chambers, committees and business forums. As a result, new 
departments have been established within the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
Moreover, the work of joint economic committees (intergovernmental organizations) has been 
renewed and there is a growing number of meetings between high-ranking politicians (both in 
Asia and in Hungary) as well as business forums underpinning Hungary’s strong commitment 
to the “Eastern opening.”11 
In China’s case, this process began well before the “Eastern opening” policy was officially 
announced in 2012. In 2004, the Hungarian consulate in Shanghai was reopened and in 2010, 
a new consulate was opened in Chongqing. Some organizations such as the Hungarian–
Chinese Economic Chamber and the Chinese–Hungarian Business Committee were 
established to intensify bilateral business relations. In addition, for some years now Hungary 
has been developing its relations with China via a multilateral forum: the first China–CEE 
Economic and Trade Forum was held in Budapest, in June 2011. Following that, the first 
meeting between the leaders of China and CEE countries was organized in Warsaw, in April 
2012.  
Hungary’s “Eastern opening” policy is not simply aimed at developing trade relations and 
opportunities but also at attracting investment from emerging Asian countries, of which China 
is considered to be an investor of growing importance. Therefore, Hungary provides state 
subsidies and incentives for potential investors outside the EU, including China. Back in the 
1990s, Hungary’s “customs free zones” proved highly attractive to greenfield foreign 
investors. Export-oriented automotive, electronics and other companies represented a large 
share of the country’s foreign trade.12 Now Hungary is the only country in the region to have 
introduced a special incentive for foreign investors from outside the EU, who can apply for 
residency visas if they fulfil the required level of investment in Hungary.
13
 Moreover, 
Hungary has the largest Chinese diaspora in the region (around 20,000 Chinese people) which 
– according to the extant literature – is a known factor to attract Chinese foreign direct 
investment (FDI)..
14
 
Given this background and all the efforts mentioned above, it is interesting that, despite the 
deliberate steps taken by the Hungarian government, trade volume between Hungary and 
China increased only moderately (since 2012 imports have decreased, see Figure 1.) and only 
minor amounts of fresh Chinese investment flowed in to Hungary following its announcement 
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of the “Eastern opening” policy15. The underlying reasons may have little to do with 
government strategies. 
For example, Hungarian companies, especially Hungarian SMEs, have little impact on the 
development of trade relations, as trade between Hungary and China is based on business 
performed by multinational companies using global production networks.
16
 The bulk of 
foreign trade between CEE countries and China is still linked to particular products and 
multinational companies – automotive, electronics and telecommunications. Therefore the 
decisions a global company takes may significantly change the trade volumes between China 
and another country, as was the case when Nokia relocated its plants out of Hungary in 2012 
and – as a result – Hungarian export capacity to Asia decreased significantly in 2012 and 
2013.
17
 
Although there have been some new investment projects, since the announcement of the 
“Eastern opening policy” there has been expectation that high value investment projects, 
similar to the former investment by Wanhua or Huawei, would be announced. This setback is 
partly due to the eurozone crisis and partly due to some loss of trust in business circles. The 
reason behind this is probably the diverging economic interests of the two sides. Hungary 
would gladly welcome Chinese greenfield investment and cheap financial support, while the 
Chinese are interested in infrastructure investment through public procurement and in 
providing credit lines (which are not compatible with EU regulations).
18
 Another explanation 
for the decline is that neighboring countries have became more active in building relations 
with China and in creating more business opportunities from which China can choose. 
Nevertheless, the government is satisfied with the results of its “Eastern opening”. As Prime 
Minister Orbán said  
 
With regard to the Eastern Opening, I can tell you that it has been implemented. I can 
say for a fact that it has been completed. The gate is open in an eastern direction, it 
must be passed through and we must take care to ensure that nobody shuts it.
19
  
 
He also added that the policy had been successful as the proportion (not volume, which had 
actually increased) of Hungary’s exports to the EU had dropped from 80 per cent in 2009 to 
below 75 per cent of total exports. The main objective is still to diversify our exports and 
therefore to increase Hungary’s exports to countries outside Europe to one-third of total 
exports by 2018, he said. He acknowledged, however, that the aim to help the export 
capability of SMEs had not been fulfilled yet.
20
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Budapest–Belgrade railway: potential and challenges 
 
The project to modernize the Belgrade–Budapest rail link is a recent example of one of the 
successful elements of both the Hungarian government’s “Eastern opening” policy and 
China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. The aim is simple: to reduce travel time between 
Budapest and Belgrade to 2.5–3 hours, and to establish closer trade links by transporting 
Chinese goods – delivered by ship to the Chinese-run Greek port of Piraeus – to Western 
Europe via Serbia and Hungary. The underlying motivations and potential outcomes are, 
however, more complex. 
The One Belt, One Road initiative is an example of economic and infrastructural 
collaboration covering the whole of Eurasia. In fact, the initiative is a set of instruments to 
facilitate connectivity in terms of trade, investment, finance and flows of tourists and 
students.
21
 Connected to this initiative, the “New Silk Road” project – the Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road – has become the cornerstone of 
China’s public diplomacy. The Silk Road Economic Belt provides opportunities for CEE 
countries that wish to participate in implementing the strategy. The railway line from the 
Chinese city of Chengdu to Łodz in Poland has been in operation since April 2013, while 
Budapest and Belgrade have also shown great interest in infrastructure building since the very 
beginning.
22
 
The geographic positions of Hungary and Serbia mean they are suited to handling the transit 
traffic between China and Europe and occupy an important role in implementing the Chinese 
grand strategy.
23
 Consequently, at the end of 2014, the prime ministers of Hungary, Serbia, 
China and Macedonia signed an agreement in Belgrade at the third Central and Eastern 
Europe–China summit on the construction of a rail link between Budapest and Belgrade. 
Regarding practical issues, the cost of investment for the whole section is around 3 billion US 
dollars, which will be financed from Chinese loans. The Hungarian section will cost around 
472 billion HUF (1.67 billion US dollars/1.5 billion euros)
24
. According to recent estimates it 
will take between two and two and a half years to construct the track. 
 
Figure 3. Rail route between Piraeus and Budapest, via Skopje and Belgrade 
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Source: People’s Daily Online. Available online: http://en.people.cn/n/2014/1218/c90883-
8824383.html (accessed on September 15, 2015). 
 
China’s motivations are easy to understand, as the New Silk Road project will allow them to 
expand their political and economic sphere of interest: they will be able to counterbalance the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and once the alternative transport routes are completed they 
will be in a more favorable strategic position, able to work off some of their industrial 
overcapacity accumulated in recent years. In addition, the Budapest–Belgrade railway project 
may provide a reference for further Chinese investment in the broader region. A more 
interesting question is: what is it that motivates the Hungarian (and Serbian) side?  
The importance of Europe, particularly Central and Eastern Europe, to the project was 
emphasized long ago by China and welcomed by several CEE countries, including Hungary. 
Hungary was the first European country to sign a memorandum of understanding with China 
on promoting the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road, during Chinese Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Budapest in June, 2015. The Hungarian government was very 
keen on the railway project and when it signed the construction agreement in 2014, Prime 
Minister Orbán called it the most important moment in cooperation between the European 
Union and China.
25
 Although slightly excessive, his comment reflects the country's 
commitment. Infrastructure development is a hot topic in all CEE countries; however, there 
are other resources – for example EU funds – to finance them. The reconstruction of the 
railway track on the Hungarian side is useful in itself, but is it worth it for Hungary, if it is 
financed from Chinese loans, and will mostly likely be implemented by Chinese firms? The 
details of the financing structure of the loan and the interest rate are not yet known but it is 
certainly to be repaid, while the construction work is unlikely to result in significant job 
creation in Hungary. For now it seems that the only benefit Hungary can expect from 
                                                        
25
 C. Keszthelyi, “Belgrade–Budapest rail construction agreement signed,” Budapest Business Journal, 
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construction comes in the form of the transit fees which will hopefully cover the loan 
repayments.
26
 
We do not know much about the government's further plans but it is telling that they are not 
advertising the additional benefits of the railway line. Being a transit country is not the only 
option. Hungary could build support infrastructure along the railway line to serve as a 
logistics and/or assembly center (since it already has experience in this field). As Matura
27
 
points out, by evaluating what will be delivered by rail and from where, Hungary could create 
factories, logistics centers and industrial or economic zones to attract Chinese (or other) 
investors. This strategy would not only better exploit the potential of the line but could create 
further jobs and manufacturing in the country. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As described above, Hungarian governments – regardless of political orientation – have 
committed themselves to developing relations with China. Hungary is regarded as occupying 
a more prominent position by Chinese people and the government than its geopolitical 
position would indicate. Hungary is open to many types of cooperation, taking every 
opportunity to promote economic relations, while the government supports China over many 
sensitive issues, such as lifting the arms embargo or granting market economy status to the 
country. Furthermore, the Hungarian government never meets government-level diplomatic 
delegations from Taiwan or Tibet and tends to remove anti-China protesters from the streets 
of Budapest when a high-level Chinese delegation visits the Hungarian capital. Thus, it is 
understandable that most Hungarian politicians strongly believe that their efforts and strong 
support for the “Eastern opening” policy have created an irresistible investment environment 
for China. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more appealing system of incentives than the current 
one.  
On the one hand, the results are obvious: Hungary’s efforts are acknowledged by Chinese 
leaders, the value of Hungarian exports is increasing year on year and Hungary has by far the 
highest level of Chinese investment, not only among the Visegrad Four but in the entire CEE 
region. On the other hand, other countries in the region have also began developing their 
relations with China and have achieved more success recently (e.g. Poland’s strategic 
partnership with China), which raises questions as to the ‘special’ nature of the Chinese–
Hungarian relationship. Hungary is willing to deepen its pragmatic cooperation with China; 
however, for the time being this objective appears to belong more to the rhetoric and 
politics,
28
 while neighboring countries have been more proactive recently.  
A healthy balance should be sought between Hungarian needs and Chinese plans and 
Hungarian companies should be helped reap the benefits of greater export opportunities. 
Instead of pursuing excessively high demands, Hungary should be more specific and patient 
in its expectations, producing more initiatives on its own. The “Eastern opening” policy is 
unique in the region, but it is too general in terms of the countries to which it applies. 
Therefore, as the majority of Hungarian scholars dealing with China suggest, given its size 
and importance, China deserves a separate strategy. 
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